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David John Chalmers (/ ˈ tʃ ɑː l m ər z /; born 20 April 1966) [1] is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Chalmers on stage for an Alan Turing Year event at De La Salle University, Manila, 27 March 2012. The terms "hard problem" and "easy problems" were coined by the philosopher David Chalmers in a 1994 talk given at The Science of Consciousness conference held in Tucson, Arizona. [4]
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory was published in 1996, and is the first book written by David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher specialising in philosophy of mind. Although the book has been greatly influential , Chalmers maintains that it is "far from perfect", as most of it was written as part of his PhD dissertation ...
The Extended Mind" by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) [4] is the paper that originally stated the EMT. Clark and Chalmers present the idea of active externalism (not to be confused with semantic externalism), in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that the separation between the mind, the body ...
In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers writes that, in some instances, the differences between "Russell's neutral monism" and his property dualism are merely semantic. [47] Philip Goff believes that neutral monism can reasonably be regarded as a form of panpsychism "in so far as it is a dual aspect view". [ 1 ]
David Chalmers [1] has been known to express sympathy toward neutral monism. In The Conscious Mind (1996) he concludes that facts about consciousness are "further facts about our world" and that there ought to be more to reality than just the physical. He then goes on to engage with a Platonic rendition of neutral monism that holds information ...
Thus, Bostrom, and writers in agreement with Bostrom such as David Chalmers, argue there might be empirical reasons for the "simulation hypothesis", and that therefore the simulation hypothesis is not a skeptical hypothesis but rather a "metaphysical hypothesis". Bostrom states he personally sees no strong argument as to which of the three ...
David Chalmers presents what he terms "A Master Argument" against PCS. [2] He argues that phenomenal concepts are ultimately characterized either in a manner too weak to bridge the explanatory gap or too strong to themselves yield to physical explanation. He contends that in either case, PCS fails to refute arguments against physicalism. [2]