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A corollary of this theorem is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The key difference between the two theorems is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite applies only to ranked voting. Because of its broader scope, Gibbard's theorem makes no claim about whether voters need to reverse their ranking of candidates, only that their optimal ...
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a theorem in social choice theory. It was first conjectured by the philosopher Michael Dummett and the mathematician Robin Farquharson in 1961 [ 1 ] and then proved independently by the philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973 [ 2 ] and economist Mark Satterthwaite in 1975. [ 3 ]
Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes is dictatorial. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a special case showing that no deterministic voting system can be fully invulnerable to strategic voting in all circumstances, regardless of how others vote.
Arrow's theorem does not cover rated voting rules, and thus cannot be used to inform their susceptibility to the spoiler effect. However, Gibbard's theorem shows these methods' susceptibility to strategic voting, and generalizations of Arrow's theorem describe cases where rated methods are susceptible to the spoiler effect.
How much of the theorem still applies? Neon Merlin 06:31, 9 January 2010 (UTC) Well, basically the same difficulties are present; you may want to study then the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. What G-S says is (essentially) that no voting procedure can satisfy simultaneously strategy-proofness and non-dictatorship.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite give an impossibility result similar in spirit to Arrow's impossibility theorem. For a very general class of games, only "dictatorial" social choice functions can be implemented.
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Gibbard's theorem shows that no deterministic single-winner voting method can be completely immune to strategy, but makes no claims about the severity of strategy or how often strategy succeeds. Later results show that some methods are more manipulable than others.