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Algorithm Output size (bits) Internal state size [note 1] Block size Length size Word size Rounds; BLAKE2b: 512 512 1024 128 [note 2]: 64 12 BLAKE2s: 256 256 512 64 [note 3]: 32 10
BLAKE was submitted to the NIST hash function competition by Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Luca Henzen, Willi Meier, and Raphael C.-W. Phan. In 2008, there were 51 entries. BLAKE made it to the final round consisting of five candidates but lost to Keccak in 2012, which was selected for the SHA-3 algorithm.
There are also truncated versions of each standard, known as SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These were also designed by the NSA. These were also designed by the NSA. SHA-3 : A hash function formerly called Keccak , chosen in 2012 after a public competition among non-NSA designers.
SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2) is a set of cryptographic hash functions designed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) and first published in 2001. [3] [4] They are built using the Merkle–Damgård construction, from a one-way compression function itself built using the Davies–Meyer structure from a specialized block cipher.
Paul Hsieh's SuperFastHash [1] 32 bits Buzhash: variable XOR/table Fowler–Noll–Vo hash function (FNV Hash) 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, or 1024 bits xor/product or product/XOR Jenkins hash function: 32 or 64 bits XOR/addition Bernstein's hash djb2 [2] 32 or 64 bits shift/add or mult/add or shift/add/xor or mult/xor PJW hash / Elf Hash: 32 or 64 bits
Crypto-C Micro Edition: 4.1.5 (December 17, 2020; ... 2.16.11 (July 7, 2021; ... 2 years ago () [24] Extended Support Release: 3.79.1 / August 18, ...
In cryptography and computer security, a length extension attack is a type of attack where an attacker can use Hash(message 1) and the length of message 1 to calculate Hash(message 1 ‖ message 2) for an attacker-controlled message 2, without needing to know the content of message 1.
Second-preimage resistance implies preimage resistance only if the size of the hash function's inputs can be substantially (e.g., factor 2) larger than the size of the hash function's outputs. [1] Conversely, a second-preimage attack implies a collision attack (trivially, since, in addition to x ′ , x is already known right from the start).