Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
For example, in the conditional statement: "If P then Q", Q is necessary for P, because the truth of Q is guaranteed by the truth of P. (Equivalently, it is impossible to have P without Q , or the falsity of Q ensures the falsity of P .) [ 1 ] Similarly, P is sufficient for Q , because P being true always implies that Q is true, but P not being ...
Hilbert's statement is sometimes misunderstood, because by the "arithmetical axioms" he did not mean a system equivalent to Peano arithmetic, but a stronger system with a second-order completeness axiom. The system Hilbert asked for a completeness proof of is more like second-order arithmetic than first-order Peano arithmetic.
These examples, one from mathematics and one from natural language, illustrate the concept of vacuous truths: "For any integer x, if x > 5 then x > 3." [11] – This statement is true non-vacuously (since some integers are indeed greater than 5), but some of its implications are only vacuously true: for example, when x is the integer 2, the statement implies the vacuous truth that "if 2 > 5 ...
Problems 1, 2, 5, 6, [a] 9, 11, 12, 15, and 22 have solutions that have partial acceptance, but there exists some controversy as to whether they resolve the problems. That leaves 8 (the Riemann hypothesis), 13 and 16 [b] unresolved. Problems 4 and 23 are considered as too vague to ever be described as solved; the withdrawn 24 would also be in ...
Then sentences that were second-order become first-order, with the formerly second-order quantifiers ranging over the second sort instead. This reduction can be attempted in a one-sorted theory by adding unary predicates that tell whether an element is a number or a set, and taking the domain to be the union of the set of real numbers and the ...
Observe then, that if we can prove that the system S is consistent (ie. the statement in the hypothesis of c), then we have proved that p is not provable. But this is a contradiction since by the 1st Incompleteness Theorem, this sentence (ie. what is implied in the sentence c , "" p " is not provable") is what we construct to be unprovable.
The example in the previous section used unformalized, natural-language reasoning. Curry's paradox also occurs in some varieties of formal logic.In this context, it shows that if we assume there is a formal sentence (X → Y), where X itself is equivalent to (X → Y), then we can prove Y with a formal proof.
On the other hand, one can affirm with certainty that "if someone does not live in California" (non-Q), then "this person does not live in San Diego" (non-P). This is the contrapositive of the first statement, and it must be true if and only if the original statement is true. Example 2. If an animal is a dog, then it has four legs. My cat has ...