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TLS/SSL support history of web browsers Browser or OS API Version Platforms SSL protocols TLS protocols Certificate support Vulnerability [n 1] Protocol selection by user [n 2]
Although this vulnerability only exists in SSL 3.0 and most clients and servers support TLS 1.0 and above, all major browsers voluntarily downgrade to SSL 3.0 if the handshakes with newer versions of TLS fail unless they provide the option for a user or administrator to disable SSL 3.0 and the user or administrator does so [citation needed].
WinSCP (FTP client for Windows) 5.5.2 and some earlier versions (only vulnerable with FTP over TLS/SSL, fixed in 5.5.3) [130] Multiple VMware products, including VMware ESXi 5.5, VMware Player 6.0, VMware Workstation 10 and the series of Horizon products, emulators and cloud computing suites [131] Several other Oracle Corporation applications ...
Several versions of the TLS protocol exist. SSL 2.0 is a deprecated [27] protocol version with significant weaknesses. SSL 3.0 (1996) and TLS 1.0 (1999) are successors with two weaknesses in CBC-padding that were explained in 2001 by Serge Vaudenay. [28]
This vulnerability (CVE-2016-0701) allows, when some particular circumstances are met, to recover the OpenSSL server's private Diffie–Hellman key. An Adobe System Security researcher, Antonio Sanso, privately reported the vulnerability. OpenSSL classified the bug as a high-severity issue, noting only version 1.0.2 was found vulnerable. [84]
The DROWN (Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption) attack is a cross-protocol security bug that attacks servers supporting modern SSLv3/TLS protocol suites by using their support for the obsolete, insecure, SSL v2 protocol to leverage an attack on connections using up-to-date protocols that would otherwise be secure.
A Lucky Thirteen attack is a cryptographic timing attack against implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that use the CBC mode of operation, first reported in February 2013 by its developers Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. [1] [2]
Therefore, turning off TLS compression makes no difference to BREACH, which can still perform a chosen-plaintext attack against the HTTP payload. [ 3 ] As a result, clients and servers are either forced to disable HTTP compression completely (thus reducing performance), or to adopt workarounds to try to foil BREACH in individual attack ...