Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of how choices will turn out. [4] [5] Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism a false dilemma. [6]
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. [1] As Steven Weinberg puts it: "I would say that free will is nothing but our conscious experience of deciding what to do, which I know I am experiencing as I write this review, and this experience is not invalidated by the ...
Free-will libertarianism is the view that the free-will thesis (that we, ordinary humans, have free will) is true and that determinism is false; in first-order language, it is the view that we (ordinary humans) have free will and the world does not behave in the way described by determinism.
In addition to Plantinga's free-will defense, there are other arguments purporting to undermine or disprove the logical argument from evil. [13] Plantinga's free-will defense is the best known of these responses at least in part because of his thoroughness in describing and addressing the relevant questions and issues in God, Freedom, and Evil.
The sovereignty (autonomy) of God, existing within a free agent, provides strong inner compulsions toward a course of action (calling), and the power of choice (election). The actions of a human are thus determined by a human acting on relatively strong or weak urges (both from God and the environment around them) and their own relative power ...
No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true) Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future. Or in van Inwagen's own words, in An Essay on Free Will: [3]
Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. [1]
The free will theorem states: Given the axioms, if the choice about what measurement to take is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters (free will assumption), then the results of the measurements cannot be determined by anything previous to the experiments. That is an "outcome open" theorem: