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The expected payoff for playing strategy 1 / 2 Y + 1 / 2 Z must be greater than the expected payoff for playing pure strategy X, assigning 1 / 2 and 1 / 2 as tester values. The argument for mixed strategy dominance can be made if there is at least one mixed strategy that allows for dominance.
In game theory, a bimatrix game is a simultaneous game for two players in which each player has a finite number of possible actions. The name comes from the fact that the normal form of such a game can be described by two matrices - matrix describing the payoffs of player 1 and matrix describing the payoffs of player 2.
In the simplest version, there is complete information. The Nash equilibrium is such that each bidder plays a mixed strategy and expected pay-offs are zero. [2] The seller's expected revenue is equal to the value of the prize. However, some economic experiments and studies have shown that over-bidding is common. That is, the seller's revenue ...
A matrix is used to present the payoff of both players in the game. For example, the best response of player one is the highest payoff for player one’s move, and vice versa. For player one, they will pick the payoffs from the column strategies. For player two, they will choose their moves based on the two row strategies.
In game theory, Kuhn's theorem relates perfect recall, mixed and unmixed strategies and their expected payoffs. It is named after Harold W. Kuhn.. The theorem states that in a game where players may remember all of their previous moves/states of the game available to them, for every mixed strategy there is a behavioral strategy that has an equivalent payoff (i.e. the strategies are equivalent).
Given a normal form game and a parameter >, a totally mixed strategy profile is defined to be -proper if, whenever a player has two pure strategies s and s' such that the expected payoff of playing s is smaller than the expected payoff of playing s' (that is (,) < (′,)), then the probability assigned to s is at most times the probability assigned to s'.
This is NOT a PBE, since the sender can improve their payoff from 0 to 1 by giving a gift. The sender's strategy is: never give, and the receiver's strategy is: reject. This is NOT a PBE, since for any belief of the receiver, rejecting is not a best-response. Note that option 3 is a Nash equilibrium.
The expected payoff for this equilibrium is 7(1/3) + 2(1/3) + 6(1/3) = 5 which is higher than the expected payoff of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The following correlated equilibrium has an even higher payoff to both players: Recommend (C, C) with probability 1/2, and (D, C) and (C, D) with probability 1/4 each