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Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization [1] is a program and competition by NIST to update their standards to include post-quantum cryptography. [2] It was announced at PQCrypto 2016. [ 3 ] 23 signature schemes and 59 encryption/ KEM schemes were submitted by the initial submission deadline at the end of 2017 [ 4 ] of which 69 total were ...
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), sometimes referred to as quantum-proof, quantum-safe, or quantum-resistant, is the development of cryptographic algorithms (usually public-key algorithms) that are currently thought to be secure against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer.
Falcon is a post-quantum signature scheme selected by the NIST at the fourth round of the post-quantum standardisation process. It was designed by Thomas Prest, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Paul Kirchner, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Thomas Pornin, Thomas Ricosset, Gregor Seiler, William Whyte, and Zhenfei Zhang.
Kyber is a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) designed to be resistant to cryptanalytic attacks with future powerful quantum computers.It is used to establish a shared secret between two communicating parties without an attacker in the transmission system being able to decrypt it.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), specified that algorithms in its post-quantum cryptography competition support a minimum of 2 64 signatures safely. [3] In 2022, NIST announced SPHINCS+ as one of three algorithms to be standardized for digital signatures. [4]
This, and the overall delivery and timing of the announcement, in the absence of post-quantum standards, raised considerable speculation about whether NSA had found weaknesses e.g. in elliptic-curve algorithms or others, or was trying to distance itself from an exclusive focus on ECC for non-technical reasons. [7] [8] [9]
NIST's changes on Dilithium 3.1 intend to support additional randomness in signing (hedged signing) and other improvements. [33] Dilithium was one of the two digital signature schemes initially chosen by the NIST in their post-quantum cryptography process, the other one being SPHINCSâș, which is not based on lattices but on hashes.
Compared to other post-quantum schemes, BLISS claims to offer better computational efficiency, smaller signature size, and higher security. A presentation once anticipated that BLISS would become a potential candidate for standardization, however it was not submitted to NIST. NIST's criteria for selecting schemes to standardize includes side ...