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In Aristotle's view, universals are incorporeal and universal, but only exist only where they are instantiated; they exist only in things. [1] Aristotle said that a universal is identical in each of its instances. All red things are similar in that there is the same universal, redness, in each thing.
A universal may have instances, known as its particulars. For example, the type dog (or doghood) is a universal, as are the property red (or redness) and the relation betweenness (or being between). Any particular dog, red thing, or object that is between other things is not a universal, however, but is an instance of a universal.
Two major forms of metaphysical realism are Platonic realism (universalia ante res), meaning "'universals before things'" [2] and Aristotelian realism (universalia in rebus), meaning "'universals in things'". [37] Platonic realism is the view that universals are real entities existing independent of particulars.
For example, Socrates is a particular (there's only one Socrates-the-teacher-of-Plato and one cannot make copies of him, e.g., by cloning him, without introducing new, distinct particulars). Redness, by contrast, is not a particular, because it is abstract and multiply instantiated (for example a bicycle, an apple, and a particular woman's hair ...
For example, the particulars Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi instantiate the universal humanity, similar to how a strawberry and a ruby instantiate the universal red. [45] A topic discussed since ancient philosophy, the problem of universals consists in the challenge of characterizing the ontological status of universals. [46]
For example, there is no Form Not-Greek, only particulars of Form Otherness that somehow suppress Form Greek. Regardless of whether Socrates meant the particulars of Otherness yield Not-Greek, Not-tall, Not-beautiful, etc., the particulars would operate specifically rather than generally, each somehow yielding only one exclusion.
In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. [1] [2] There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals – that which can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity).
[1] [2] The position maintains that universals exist both in particular objects and as concepts in the mind. [3] The "problem of universals" was an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. For John Duns Scotus, a Franciscan philosopher, theologian and Catholic priest, universals such as "greenness" and "goodness" exist in ...