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Meno (/ ˈ m iː n oʊ /; Ancient Greek: Μένων, Ménōn) is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 385 BC., but set at an earlier date around 402 BC. [1] Meno begins the dialogue by asking Socrates whether virtue (in Ancient Greek: ἀρετή, aretē) can be taught, acquired by practice, or comes by nature. [2]
The concept posits the claim that learning involves the act of rediscovering knowledge from within oneself. This stands in contrast to the opposing doctrine known as empiricism, which posits that all knowledge is derived from experience and sensory perception. Plato develops the theory of anamnesis in his Socratic dialogues: Meno, Phaedo, and ...
Plato's problem describes the disparity between input (poverty of the stimulus) and output (grammar). As Plato suggests in the Meno dialogue, the bridge between input (whether limited or lacking) and output is innate knowledge. Poverty of the stimulus is crucial to the Platonic argument and it is a linchpin concept in Chomskyan linguistics.
“Knowledge is the food of the soul.” 42. “Our object in the construction of the state is the greatest happiness of the whole, and not that of any one class.”
Paradox of analysis: It seems that no conceptual analysis can meet the requirements both of correctness and of informativeness. Buridan's bridge : Plato says: "If your next statement is true, I will allow you to cross, but if it is false, I will throw you in the water."
(Plato, Apology 22d, translated by Harold North Fowler, 1966). [1] It is also sometimes called the Socratic paradox, although this name is often instead used to refer to other seemingly paradoxical claims made by Socrates in Plato's dialogues (most notably, Socratic intellectualism and the Socratic fallacy). [2]
Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only that which is loved by all of the gods unanimously (9e). At this point the dilemma surfaces. Socrates asks whether the gods love the pious because it is the pious, or whether the pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods (10a).
Plato suggests, in his Theaetetus (210a) and Meno (97a–98b), that "knowledge" may be defined as justified true belief. For over two millennia, this definition of knowledge was accepted by subsequent philosophers. An item of information's justifiability, truth, and belief were seen as the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.