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And using the term "infinite" in the sense of "complete" or "exhaustive", he ascribed to Substance an infinity of Attributes, that is, all the attributes there are, whether known to man or not. [17] [20] Now reality, for Spinoza, is activity. Substance is incessantly active, each Attribute exercising its kind of energy in all possible ways.
The traditional understanding of an attribute in philosophy is similar to Spinoza's modes, though he uses that word differently. [132] To him, an attribute is "that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance", and there are possibly an infinite number of them. [134]
Substance, according to Spinoza, is one and indivisible, but has multiple "attributes". He regards an attribute, though, as "what we conceive as constituting the [single] essence of substance". The single essence of one substance can be conceived of as material and also, consistently, as mental.
“The Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes, and Modes” in Michael Della Rocca (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 84–113. “ Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas ,” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 86 (2013 ...
Mental substance, according to the idea held by dualists and idealists, is a non-physical substance of which minds are composed. This substance is often referred to as consciousness . This is opposed to the materialists , who hold that what we normally think of as mental substance is ultimately physical matter (i.e., brains).
Principia philosophiae cartesianae (PPC; "The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy") or Renati Descartes principia philosophiae, more geometrico demonstrata ("The Principles of René Descartes' Philosophy, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order") is a philosophical work of Baruch Spinoza published in Amsterdam in 1663.
Modes are properties of a substance that follow from its attributes and therefore have only a dependent form of existence. [52] Spinoza sees everyday-things like rocks, cats or ourselves as mere modes and thereby opposes the traditional Aristotelian and Cartesian conception of categorizing them as substances. [53]
Affect is thus a special case of the more neutral term "affection" (affectio), which designates the form "taken on" by some thing, [6] the mode, state or quality of a body's relation to the world or nature (or infinite "substance"). In Part III, "Definitions of the Emotions/Affects", Spinoza defines 48 different forms of affect, including love ...