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Here, "state" refers to different "amounts" of external/physical consciousness, from a total absence in coma, persistent vegetative state and general anesthesia, to a fluctuating and limited form of conscious sensation in a minimally conscious state such as sleep walking or during a complex partial epileptic seizure. [11]
However, these do not generally include physical interpretations. Whitehead [41] proposed a fundamental ontological basis for a relation consistent with James's idea of co-consciousness, in which many causal elements are co-available or "compresent" in a single event or "occasion" that constitutes a unified experience. Whitehead did not give ...
The quantum mind or quantum consciousness is a group of hypotheses proposing that local physical laws and interactions from classical mechanics or connections between neurons alone cannot explain consciousness, [1] positing instead that quantum-mechanical phenomena, such as entanglement and superposition that cause nonlocalized quantum effects, interacting in smaller features of the brain than ...
After all, there‘s still an enormous amount we don’t know about consciousness or the physical structures of the brain. At the end of the day (or century!), just one theory will prove to be ...
The notion that quantum physics must be the underlying mechanism for consciousness first emerged in the 1990s, when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Roger Penrose, Ph.D., and anesthesiologist Stuart ...
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem.It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events.
This collapse is supposed to occur upon any act of measurement; and in one interpretation, the only way to distinguish a measurement from a nonmeasurement is via the presence of consciousness. This theory is certainly not universally accepted (for a start, it presupposes that consciousness is not itself physical, surely contrary to the views of ...
The difficulty is as follows: even if consciousness is physical, it is not clear which physical states correspond to which conscious states. The bridges between the two levels of description will be contingent, rather than necessary. This is significant because in most contexts, relating two scientific levels of descriptions (such as physics ...