Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Jay Adair (born 1969/1970) is an American billionaire businessman, the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and current Executive Chairman of Copart, a publicly traded company specializing in vehicle salvage and online auctions. [2] [3] He is known for his role in advancing Copart’s business model, particularly its transition to online auctions.
Copart provides vehicle sellers with a range of services to process and sell repairable and clean title vehicles over the internet, using its patented virtual auction technology, named VB3, as well as others of its auction-related brands. Copart is a public company and is traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol CPRT and has been named to ...
CEO of Copart Inc (30-Year Financial, Insider Trades) A Jayson Adair (insider trades) sold 300,000 shares of CPRT on 12/15/2020 at an average price of $121.2 a share.
He took Copart public in 1994. [4] He launched an online bidding platform for wrecked cars in 1998 [1] (or 2002 [4]). Willis Johnson retired from his position of CEO of Copart in 2010 and moved to Nashville, Tennessee. [4] In 2015, he co-founded now defunct on-demand household chore app, Takl. [4] July 2021.
Manheim, Inc. is an automobile auction company. As a subsidiary of Cox Automotive, a subsidiary of privately owned Cox Enterprises, Inc. based in Atlanta, Georgia, Manheim's primary business is wholesaling vehicles via a bidding process using traditional and online formats.
Mecum Auctions, Inc. is an American auction company specializing in collector cars and motorcycles. It was founded by Dana Mecum in 1988, and was originally based in Marengo, Illinois . Since 2011, it has been headquartered in Walworth, Wisconsin .
Combinatorial auctions were first proposed by Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982), for the allocation of airport landing slots.Their paper introduced many key ideas on combinatorial auctions, including the mathematical programming formulation of the auctioneer’s problem, the connection between the winner determination problem and the set-packing problem, the issue of computational complexity ...
The uniform-price auction does not, however, result in bidders bidding their true valuations as they do in a second-price auction unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit. A generalization of the Vickrey auction that maintains the incentive to bid truthfully is known as the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism.