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David Malet Armstrong AO FAHA (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014), [4] often D. M. Armstrong, was an Australian philosopher.He is well known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature.
In both Universals and Scientific Realism (1978) and Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (1989), Armstrong describes the relative merits of a number of nominalist theories which appeal either to "natural classes" (a view he ascribes to Anthony Quinton), concepts, resemblance relations or predicates, and also discusses non-realist "trope ...
Armstrong looks at Gilbert Ryle's refinement of Behaviourism, Dispositional Behaviourism. Armstrong illustrates Ryle's idea with a description of glass - brittleness is the disposition of materials such as glass to shatter under certain circumstances. Whether or not the glass shatters in a particular instance, it has the disposition to do so.
In metaphysics, a universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things. [1] For example, suppose there are two chairs in a room, each of which is green.
Everyone knows what Neil Armstrong said as he stepped onto the Moon, and when Ryan Gosling delivers the line in "First Man", which opened the Venice Film Festival on Wednesday, it sounds like ...
Scotistic realism (also Scotist realism or Scotist formalism) is the Scotist position on the problem of universals. It is a form of moderate realism, which is sometimes referred to as 'scholastic realism'. [1] [2] The position maintains that universals exist both in particular objects and as concepts in the mind. [3]
In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels. [1] [2] There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals – that which can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity).
With D. M. Armstrong, Campbell was one of the founders of so-called Australian materialism and, within it, of a variety of trope theory. He also had a distinctive view of concrete and abstract objects: the former can exist by themselves, and the latter are incapable of independent existence. [citation needed]