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Arthur Cecil Pigou (/ ˈ p iː ɡ uː /; 18 November 1877 – 7 March 1959) was an English economist.As a teacher and builder of the School of Economics at the University of Cambridge, he trained and influenced many Cambridge economists who went on to take chairs of economics around the world.
The book discusses the views of Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigou on competition and the theory of the firm. Marshall believed that competition was imprecise, with prices being influenced by the rise and fall of demand.
Arthur Cecil Pigou; The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. 1932; Description: Pigou was one of the most influential economists that dealt with Welfare economics. He developed the idea of Pigovian tax. Importance: Topic creator, breakthrough, influence
The Pigou effect was first popularised by Arthur Cecil Pigou in 1943, in The Classical Stationary State an article in the Economic Journal. [4] He had proposed the link from balances to consumption earlier, and Gottfried Haberler had made a similar objection the year after the General Theory's publication. [5]
Influential theories have been the ability theory presented by Arthur Cecil Pigou [2] and the benefit theory developed by Erik Lindahl. [3] [4] There is a later version of the benefit theory known as the "voluntary exchange" theory. [5]
The roots of the science can be tracked back to the 1920s when The Political Economy of War by Arthur Cecil Pigou was originally published. [4] A major step forward can be then accredited to Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean and their work The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age from 1960. [2]
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959) In 1920 Alfred Marshall's student Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959) published Wealth and Welfare , which insisted on the possibility of market failures , claiming that markets are inefficient in the case of economic externalities , and the state must interfere to prevent them.
In 1920, British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou published The Economics of Welfare. [8] In it, he argues that industrialists seek their own marginal private interest. When the marginal social interest diverges from the marginal private interest, the industrialist has no incentive to internalize the marginal social cost.