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A "responsive bidder" is one who submits a "responsive bid", one which, if accepted by the government as submitted, will obligate the contractor to perform the exact thing being called for in the solicitation. [40] FAR 14.301 states: To be considered for award, a bid must comply in all material respects with the invitation for bids.
Under CICA all procurements must be competed as full and open (there are some exceptions found in FAR Part 6) so that any qualified company can submit an offer. The bidding procedure should take the form of sealed bidding, previously known as "formal advertising", [2] solicited prior to 2001 through Commerce Business Daily. [3]
FAR Part 14 details the requirements for conducting a "sealed bid" tender, where federal requirements can be stated "clearly, accurately, and completely" and price is the only determinant of contract awardee. [25] Under this part, Unnecessarily restrictive specifications or requirements that might unduly limit the number of bidders are prohibited.
A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. [1] In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. [2]: p2 [3]
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.
Education vendor alleges DOE sidestepped bidding rules in $34M ‘Illustrative Math’ curriculum purchase
For simplicity we look for SBNE in which each bidder bids times his/her signal: Xenia bids and Yakov bids . We try to find the value of r {\displaystyle r} in each case. In a sealed-bid second-price auction , there is a SBNE with r = 1 {\displaystyle r=1} , i.e., each bidder bids exactly his/her signal.
In the sealed first-price auction, the increasing bid function B(v) is an equilibrium if bidding strategies are mutual best responses. That is, if buyer 1 has value v, their best response is to bid b = B(v) if they believes that their opponent is using this same bidding function. Suppose buyer 1 deviates and bids b = B(z) rather than B(v) . Let ...