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John Stuart Mill (1859) A Few Words on Non-Intervention at the Online Library of Liberty "A Few Words on Non-Intervention Archived 22 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine" from Foreign Policy Perspectives No. 8 ISSN 0267-6761 ISBN 0-948317-96-5 (An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance, 25 Chapter Chambers, Esterbrooke Street, London SW1P 4NN.)
Defeasibility is found in literatures that are concerned with argument and the process of argument, or heuristic reasoning. Defeasible reasoning is a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning , where the reasoning does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e., where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion ...
Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 is an English decision on the conflict of laws in tort. The Court developed a two limbed test for determining whether a tort occurring outside of the court's jurisdiction can be actionable. [1] In time this came to be referred to as the "dual-actionability test" (or "double actionability test").
While in fact Plato seems to disavow justified true belief as constituting knowledge at the end of Theaetetus, the claim that Plato unquestioningly accepted this view of knowledge stuck until the proposal of the Gettier problem. [4] The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true belief".
Infinite regress. In epistemology, the regress argument is the argument that any proposition requires a justification.However, any justification itself requires support. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly (infinitely) questioned, resulting in infinite re
Evidentialism is, therefore, a thesis about which beliefs are justified and which are not. For philosophers Richard Feldman and Earl Conee , evidentialism is the strongest argument for justification because it identifies the primary notion of epistemic justification.
This highly influential argument eschewed justification as a necessary requirement for knowledge. [21]: ch. 7 Nozick gives four conditions for S's knowing that P (S=Subject / P=Proposition): P is true; S believes that P; If it were the case that (not-P), S would not believe that P; If it were the case that P, S would believe that P
The argument runs thus: Galileo was ridiculed in his time for his scientific observations, but was later acknowledged to be right; the proponent argues that since their non-mainstream views are provoking ridicule and rejection from other scientists, they will later be recognized as correct, like Galileo. [5]