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[1] This chapter is well known for advancing two arguments against moral universalism: the argument from disagreement and the argument from queerness. The chapter is excerpted in the fourth (2007) edition of Stuart and James Rachels's The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy. [2]
The argument from morality is an argument for the existence of God. Arguments from morality tend to be based on moral normativity or moral order. Arguments from moral normativity observe some aspect of morality and argue that God is the best or only explanation for this, concluding that God must exist. Arguments from moral order are based on ...
Hume's arguments against founding morality on reason are often now included in the category of moral anti-realist arguments. As Humean-inspired philosopher John Mackie suggests, for there to exist moral facts about the world, recognizable by reason and intrinsically motivating, they would have to be very queer facts.
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality" is an essay written by Peter Singer in 1971 and published in Philosophy & Public Affairs in 1972. It argues that affluent persons are morally obligated to donate far more resources to humanitarian causes than is considered normal in Western cultures .
It implies that if two people disagree about a moral evaluation then at least one of them is wrong. This observation is sometimes taken as an argument against moral realism since moral disagreement is widespread in most fields. [109] Moral relativists reject the idea that morality is an objective feature of reality. They argue instead that ...
The most prominent argument for nihilism is the argument from queerness. J. L. Mackie argues that there are no objective ethical values , by arguing that they would be queer (strange): If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."
A related argument revolves around non-human organisms' ability to feel pain. If animals could be shown to suffer, as humans do, then many of the arguments against human suffering could be extended to animals. [35] One such reaction is transmarginal inhibition, a phenomenon observed in humans and some animals akin to mental breakdown.